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Turmoil in the House of Assembly leading up to the 2019 general election in Newfoundland 
and Labrador foreshadowed an unusual result. Liberal Premier Dwight Ball, stung by public 
outrage over his government’s 2016 austerity budget, spent the balance of his term wary of 
difficult decisions while ministers and MHAs hurled accusations of bullying at each other. 
The Liberal government routinely evoked its The Way Forward planning document as a 
source of policy solutions and blamed the Progressive Conservatives for sanctioning the 
Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project boondoggle. Public opinion polls often put the Liberals 
in front, but Ball’s popularity lagged behind his party’s and occasionally that of the 
opposition leaders. The election produced the first minority government in nearly half a 
century, including the rare victory of two Independents, and the Liberal caucus soon agitated 
for new leadership. The province’s dire economic circumstances mean that more political 
turmoil is likely. 
Résumé 
Les turbulences à l’assemblée législative à l'approche des élections générales de 2019 à 
Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador laissent présager un résultat inhabituel. Le premier ministre 
libéral Dwight Ball, piqué par l'indignation de la population à propos du budget d'austérité 
de son gouvernement pour 2016, a passé le reste de son mandat à se méfier des décisions 
difficiles, tandis que les ministres et les députés se lançaient des accusations d'intimidation 
les uns envers les autres. Le gouvernement libéral a régulièrement évoqué son document de 
planification «The Way Forward» comme une source de solutions politiques et a reproché 
aux progressistes-conservateurs d'avoir sanctionné le gâchis du projet hydroélectrique de 
Muskrat Falls. Les sondages d'opinion mettent souvent les libéraux en avance, mais la 
popularité de Ball est à la traîne par rapport à celle de son parti et, parfois, des chefs de 
l'opposition. L'élection a produit le premier gouvernement minoritaire en près d'un demi-
siècle, y compris la rare victoire de deux indépendants, et le caucus libéral s'est rapidement 
agité pour changer de leadership. La situation économique désastreuse de la province laisse 
présager de nouvelles turbulences politiques. 
Keywords: Newfoundland and Labrador, 2019 provincial election, Dwight Ball, House of 
Assembly, minority government 
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Introduction  
Politics in Newfoundland and Labrador has been aptly described as Turmoil, as Usual 
(McLeod, 2016). In recent years, democratic government has been akin to a roller coaster 
ride whose tracks follow the rise and fall of oil prices. In the first decade of this century, the 
astonishing popularity of the Progressive Conservative (PC) government led by Danny 
Williams benefitted from the rising price of oil. However, in mid-2014 the price of Brent 
crude oil began a precipitous decline from over $110 US/barrel to under $30 by early 
January 2015. Turbulent politics resulted as politicians tried to grapple with a provincial 
government and an economy that had grown dependent on offshore oil (see Marland, 2016). 
By the time the Liberals formed government in late 2015, the price of oil had begun a bumpy 
ascent, yet the massive cost overruns of the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project combined 
with government spending outstripping revenues placed the province in a precipitous 
situation. Freshly installed Premier Dwight Ball soon experienced turmoil of his own as he 
presided over a calamitous period in the storied history of the Newfoundland and Labrador 
House of Assembly. 
Three aspects of Ball’s leadership style came to the fore during the 48th general assembly 
(2015-2019). First, wherever possible blame former PC governments; second, champion the 
strategic thinking of the 2016 policy document The Way Forward; and third, incur self-
inflicted wounds when aversion of responsibility fails to take hold. The 2016 austerity 
budget was a watershed moment in how the Liberals would govern under his leadership. 
Unwilling to endure such backlash again, the premier’s reluctance to quell controversy 
sometimes prolonged the negative media coverage, particularly with respect to cabinet and 
caucus management. An election reckoning seemed likely in 2019. 
Heading into the 2019 general election, public opinion polls indicated that the Liberals 
would be in a close race with the resurgent PCs, while the moribund New Democratic Party 
(NDP) would be hard-pressed to get their new leader elected. Historically, governing parties 
have enjoyed long periods of uninterrupted rule in Newfoundland and Labrador, alternating 
between Liberal governments (1949-1972, 1989-2003) and Progressive Conservative 
governments (1972-1989, 2003-2015). Governing parties usually win a majority of seats 
multiple times. Notably, when a first-time government seeks re-election, it has always 
increased its vote share and seat count. We would therefore have expected the Liberals to 
return to office with a majority of seats. Instead, the Liberals ended up eking out a minority 
government, the first such result in the province since the 1971 election, which 
overshadowed the rare feat of two Independents being elected. With an even more unstable 
political balance of power and no fiscal respite in view, just eight months after the election 
Premier Ball would announce his plans to resign, propelling the Liberal Party into a 
leadership race and demonstrating yet again that the politics of Newfoundland and Labrador 
are as predictable as the price of oil. 




Dwight Ball’s First Term, 2015-2019  
On November 30, 2015, the Liberals ended 12 years of Tory rule by securing a majority 
government with 31 of 40 seats in the House of Assembly. The opposition parties were 
reduced to seven PCs and two New Democrats. A slimmed-down cabinet of just 13 members, 
including the premier, signalled interest in fiscal belt-tightening. Leading the higher-profile 
members was businesswoman and former leadership contestant Cathy Bennett who was 
appointed minister of finance. Notable Liberal Members of the House of Assembly (MHAs) 
joining her were former Members of Parliament Gerry Byrne (Corner Brook) and Siobhan 
Coady (St. John’s West), party stalwart Eddie Joyce (Humber – Bay of Islands), former PC 
minister Tom Osborne (Waterford Valley), and former NDP MHAs Dale Kirby (Mount Scio) 
and Christopher Mitchelmore (St. Barbe – L’Anse aux Meadows). The media savvy Andrew 
Parsons (Burgeo – La Poile) was appointed minister of justice and government house leader. 
Among those left out of cabinet was Paul Lane (Mount Pearl – Southlands) who had crossed 
the floor from the PCs and was re-elected as a Liberal. 
Premier Ball immediately declared that strong financial management was his 
government’s top priority (CBC, 2015). Minister Bennett was tasked with the immense 
responsibility of mitigating the province’s deficit, which had ballooned to $1.8 billion. A 
provincial financial review was released just one week after the cabinet was sworn in. The 
Treasury Board was directed to engage in a line-by-line analysis of government budgets to 
identify cost savings, principally through attrition (i.e., not filling jobs as they become 
vacant). All nonessential travel was suspended. 
The ascetic April 2016 budget was the most contentious moment of Ball’s tenure. In a 
blatant act of breaking campaign promises, Minister Bennett unveiled a budget rife with tax 
increases. The budget doubled the gasoline tax, hiked income tax rates, increased 
government service fees and reversed a key campaign promise not to increase the 
Harmonized Sales Tax from 13 percent to 15 percent. Despite promising no layoffs 
approximately 600 jobs were cut, many of which were vacant positions. Classroom sizes 
were set to increase, infrastructure plans were postponed or cancelled, and student loans 
returned in lieu of grants (Roberts, 2016a). Especially contentious was a temporary deficit 
reduction levy. The levy applied to anyone earning at least $20,000 in taxable income and 
thus approximately 62 percent of tax filers would have to pay the new tax. Controversy also 
centred on news that more than half of the province’s library branches would close (Graham, 
2017). None of this was what the Liberals had promised in the 2015 campaign.  
Public demonstrations erupted at the Confederation Building. The protests were fuelled 
by social media activists converging under the Twitter hashtag #NLrising and by the 
organizational strength of public sector unions. MHA Lane was expulsed from the Liberal 
caucus for saying that he intended to vote for an opposition motion to eliminate the levy. 
Sustained pressure forced the government to raise the levy’s minimum income threshold to 
$50,000, meaning that about three quarters of tax filers would be exempt from paying it—
up from 38 percent exempt—whereas the rest would pay an annual levy calculated using the 
original scale (Canadian Press, 2016). Eventually the government would backtrack on the 
library closures as well. When the levy came into effect on July 1, 2016, the escalating scale 
meant that someone earning $55,000 would have to pay $100 annually, a resident earning 
$100,000 would pay a levy of $700, and so forth. The government would find other money 
through cost efficiency initiatives, such as digitization. Further funds would be identified 
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through a zero-based budgeting agenda requiring departments and government entities to 
justify all spending. The Liberal government estimated that the books would be balanced 
within five years (Barry, 2016). Ensuing budgets would be unadventurous, notwithstanding 
the elimination of some management jobs (Roberts, 2017a). 
Usually new governments benefit from a post-election honeymoon. Indeed, an Angus 
Reid public opinion survey in February 2016 found Premier Ball’s approval rating at 60 
percent, the second highest of any premier in Canada at the time (Dangerfield, 2016). By 
May, public approval of Ball plunged to just 17 percent, the worst in the country. Another 
poll showed the party’s support was at the same level as that of the deeply unpopular PC 
government in its final year in power (Table 1).1 More ominously, Premier Ball’s personal 
popularity was lower than that of any of his Newfoundland and Labrador predecessors in 
recent memory. To put the public animosity in perspective, when the PC government 
delivered an austerity budget in 2004, the percentage of citizens preferring Williams as 
premier dropped to 39 percent – a number that Ball would not achieve for the rest of his 
term. However, an abnormally high number of people were unable to identify a leader they 
would prefer as premier. In June, posters calling on Ball to resign adorned light poles along 
roadways around the Confederation Building. More controversy ensued when internal 
emails showed that the premier’s director of communications had tried to have government 
staff remove the posters (CBC, 2016).  
A challenge for fiscal hawks and doves alike was navigating the Muskrat Falls fiasco, also 
known as the Lower Churchill Project. Initiated by Premier Williams, and pursued by his 
successor Kathy Dunderdale, the megaproject incurred multi-billion dollar cost overruns. 
Public angst grew in April 2016 when Premier Ball and his Minister of Natural Resources, 
Siobhan Coady, announced the resignation of the CEO of Nalcor Energy. Ed Martin had 
overseen the Crown corporation and worked closely with former PC premiers to advance 
the Muskrat Falls project. It turned out that Nalcor’s board of directors had dismissed Martin 
without cause, triggering a severance payout of nearly $1.4 million during a period of fiscal 
austerity (McLeod, 2017). New Nalcor CEO Stan Marshall promptly labelled the project a 
“boondoggle” (Roberts, 2016b). 
Further churn in executive offices stirred political turmoil at precisely the moment that 
the province needed stability. Within a year of assuming office, the chief of staff, deputy chief 
of staff, the director of communications and the press secretary all left or were forced out of 
the premier’s office (Cowan and Kelland, 2016). The sense of executive drift ensued in 
September 2016 when private sector lawyer and former Liberal leadership contestant 
Bernard Coffey was appointed as the non-partisan clerk of the executive council. His 




1 See public opinion survey tables in previous Newfoundland and Labrador election summaries 
published in the Canadian Political Science Review. 





Opinion Survey Data, Newfoundland and Labrador Decided Voters (2015-2019) 
(1) “If a provincial election were held today in NL, which party would you vote for?” 
(2) “Which one of the following individuals would you most prefer as Premier of NL?” 
(typical margin of error +/-3.5 percent at 95 percent confidence level) 
Month (1) Party Preference1 (2) Leader Preference  






Aug. 2015 48 27 25 1 42 24 17 17 
Nov. 2015 67 22 10 1 50 27 11 11 
Feb. 2016 66 23 11 0 53 29 8 11 
May 2016 27 34 38 2 18 35 22 25 
Aug. 2016 34 33 32 1 17 32 24 27 
Nov. 2016 42 34 23 1 27 35 17 21 
Feb. 2017 33 39 26 1 21 33 23 23 
May 2017 34 40 24 2 23 36 16 25 
Aug. 2017 40 33 24 3 23 29 18 30 
Nov. 2017 44 33 19 3 31 31 19 20 
Feb. 2018 41 33 24 2 28 27 23 22 
May 2018 36 42 22 0 27 34 19 20 
Aug. 2018 43 35 19 2 31 30 16 23 
Nov. 2018 46 35 17 1 32 30 17 21 
Feb. 2019 45 38 16 0 38 31 12 19 
May 2019 46 42 7 5 38 30 12 20 
Aug. 2019 42 32 23 2 34 26 21 21 
1 Decided voters only. 
2 Ches Crosbie succeeded Paul Davis as PC leader on April 28, 2018. 
3 On March 7, 2015 Earle McCurdy succeeded Lorraine Michael as NDP leader. Michael became leader again on 
interim basis on September 28, 2017. On April 8, 2018, Gerry Rogers replaced Michael. On March 5, 2019 Alison 
Coffin became leader. 
Source: Corporate Research Associates Inc. (http://cra.ca), now known as Narrative Research. 
 
In November 2016, the Liberal government released a planning document. The Way 
Forward was a culmination of government resources used to create a corporate plan. This 
was necessary given the thinness of the party’s election campaign platform. The Way 
Forward became a talisman to guide the Ball government’s decisions. However, efforts to 
introduce stability would be undermined again by human resources issues. It became known 
that Coffey was involved in two lawsuits suing government agencies, one of which he filed 
on the day of his appointment (Antle, 2017). That the head of the public service was a lawyer 
pursuing active legal claims against the government was an obvious conflict of interest. 
Coffey resigned in May 2017 following a series of negative news stories. That July, Cathy 
Bennett abruptly resigned as finance minister, prompting a shuffle that moved Tom Osborne 
into the post. Upon resigning, Bennett said she contended with threats during her brief 
tenure, a remark widely assumed to refer to cyberbullying she experienced after delivering 
the austerity budget (Cowan, 2017). Later, the MHA would reveal that the threats had 
emanated from within the Liberal cabinet and caucus. She alleged being subject to mobbing 
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and mild gaslighting; that is, other Liberals stamped out her dissenting voice and employed 
psychological tactics to make her feel an outcast (CBC, 2018a). The Liberal caucus would go 
on to lose its most strident advocate of fiscal discipline when Bennett resigned as an MHA 
less than three years after the election. 
In November 2017, Ball announced a public inquiry into Muskrat Falls. The stated 
purpose was to uncover how the megaproject’s cost had doubled to more than $12.7 billion 
in a province of half a million people. The inquiry would be a public platform to keep political 
mismanagement by former PC governments in the news. Indeed, Muskrat Falls had become 
a top issue of public concern. Technocratic testimony and forensic reports were punctuated 
by public interest in Williams, Dunderdale, and Martin taking the stand. The main takeaway 
was that politicians had placed excessive trust in Nalcor personnel. When Ball eventually 
testified in July 2019, he said: “We were told the project would be $6.2 billion. We’re at $12.7. 
We were never told that this project would be nearly 30 per cent of the net debt of this 
province” (CBC, 2019a). The premier remarked that the PCs should never have sanctioned 
the project and yet the Liberal government’s decision to carry on with it was justified 
(McKenzie-Sutter, 2019b). The final report by Commissioner Richard LeBlanc was released 
in 2020 at a cost of over $16 million. 
The ballooning costs of Muskrat Falls put more pressure on the government to get its 
financial house in order. In January 2018, the government negotiated a wage freeze with 
public sector unions. The cabinet sought cost savings and yet was concerned about further 
dampening the economic mood of the province. The new collective agreement with the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public and Private Employees (NAPE) included 
a no-layoff clause. As well, an early payout was offered to employees in exchange for 
relinquishing the future financial liability of severance payments (CBC, 2018c). The 
government had difficulty keeping up with the demand to issue cheques. The long-term cost 
savings offered an added benefit of potentially stimulating economic activity. 
Two more Liberals left the party in April 2018. Minister of Municipal Affairs Eddie Joyce 
and Minister of Education Dale Kirby were removed from cabinet and caucus in the wake of 
bullying and harassment allegations from colleagues. Turmoil in the legislature ensued as 
leaks disclosed information about complaints filed with the Commissioner for Legislative 
Standards. Minister of Service NL Sherry Gambin-Walsh (Placentia – St. Mary’s), Liberal 
MHAs Colin Holloway (Terra Nova) and Pam Parsons (Harbour Grace – Port de Grave), and 
PC MHA Tracey Perry (Fortune Bay – Cape La Hune) all came forward with concerns in some 
manner. The most unusual involved Holloway and Parsons filing a complaint with the Royal 
Newfoundland Constabulary about sustained personal attacks from the anonymous Twitter 
account @WackJobNL, which some speculated was operated by a sitting MHA (Maher, 2018). 
The commissioner’s report revealed considerable infighting within the Liberal cabinet and 
caucus. Joyce was found to have broken the MHA code of conduct by misusing his resources 
to help a friend obtain a government job and Kirby was found to have made an inappropriate 
comment to Parsons. Both Independent MHAs were refused re-entry into the Liberal caucus 
and all MHAs were encouraged to participate in anti-harassment training. Suffice it to say 
the legislature was consumed with interpersonal conflict. 
Meanwhile, the Progressive Conservatives were regrouping. In October 2016, former 
Premier Paul Davis announced his intent to step down as leader of the PC party. A leadership 
race attracted two contestants. In April 2018 high-profile lawyer Ches Crosbie prevailed over 
Tony Wakeham, a former health board CEO. Crosbie had been the frontrunner owing to his 




public profile and his family’s political lineage, particularly the pedigree of his father John 
Crosbie, a former federal and provincial minister. The leadership candidates were not MHAs 
and had not previously stood for election. Crosbie’s campaign had begun in an atypical 
manner when he announced that in the early 1990s he was convicted for refusing a 
breathalyzer test (Roberts, 2017b). 
The PCs won all three by-elections contested during the 48th general assembly. They 
held the Mount Pearl North seat vacated by former PC minister Steve Kent and retained 
Davis’s seat in Topsail – Paradise. Crosbie won in Windsor Lake, which Bennett had 
represented, providing the new PC leader with a seat in the legislature. However, in October 
2018 PC Party president Graydon Pelley tendered his resignation to lead a new party. The 
Newfoundland and Labrador Alliance (NL Alliance) proposed to fix the political system 
through honest and transparent government that would subject major decisions to public 
consultation (CBC, 2018b). The anti-establishment party threatened to attract PC 
supporters. 
The provincial NDP changed leaders as well – twice. In September 2017, nearly two years 
after failing to win a seat in the House of Assembly, former fisheries union leader Earle 
McCurdy resigned as NDP leader. Former leader Lorraine Michael (St John’s East – Quidi 
Vidi) returned to the post in an interim capacity. As the party’s only other MHA, Gerry Rogers 
(St John’s Centre) was favoured to assume the leadership. In April 2018, she prevailed in a 
leadership race against Alison Coffin, a Memorial University economics instructor. Rogers 
was the province’s first out LGBTQ+ party leader. However, with an early election call 
pending, in February 2019 Rogers abruptly relinquished the leadership and announced that 
she would not seek re-election. At the time, the NDP was at 12 percent in the polls, while the 
Liberals and PCs were in a statistical tie at 44 percent and 42 percent respectively (CBC, 
2019f). The next month, the NDP executive acclaimed Coffin as leader. The political novice 
was faced with the daunting task of hurriedly developing a campaign platform, raising 
money, recruiting candidates, and getting an election machine ready. 
Pre-Writ Period  
Politicians publicly mused about the conflict of provincial and federal elections scheduled 
for October 2019. As the calendar turned to 2019, rumours swirled that a Spring election 
was in the cards, fuelled by Premier Ball refusing to rule out the possibility (CBC, 2019d). 
The date of the previous provincial election had likewise been changed so as not to interfere 
with the national vote, although it was pushed ahead to extend the life of the government, 
not called early for the government’s advantage. The Liberal party was flush with cash (CBC, 
2019c) and was about to follow the timeworn election year practice of trying to buy votes 
with government money. Indeed, the Liberal government marked an optimistic milestone: 
March 2019 was the first time since February 2016 that public opinion polls registered 
satisfaction ratings that exceeded disapproval, albeit within the margin of error (Corporate 
Research Associates, 2019). They had also been leading in the polls since the previous August 
(see Table 1). 
Premier Ball signalled that his government would leverage connections with its federal 
Liberal counterpart to maximize returns on a renegotiated Atlantic Accord. The federal-
provincial agreement, signed in 1985, spells out how the governments jointly manage the oil 
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and gas situated off the province’s shores. In 2005, Williams’ popularity soared when he 
ordered the Canadian flag removed from provincial buildings and then triumphantly 
returned from Ottawa with a $2 billion commitment. But Ball’s style of leadership was 
different. As one commentator observed, “Dwight Ball is no Danny Williams. He doesn’t seem 
to like conflict, appears to go out of his way to not rock the boat, and clearly prefers that 
things be civil—and quiet—rather than rowdy and chaotic” (Gushue, 2018). Hints of federal 
and provincial representatives working on a new agreement culminated in an April 1 photo 
op. Federal Indigenous Services Minister Seamus O’Regan, the Liberal MP for St. John’s South 
– Mount Pearl and the province’s representative in the federal cabinet, sat onstage with 
Premier Ball as they signed a renewed agreement. The province will receive about $3.3 
billion over 38 years, including immediate payments of about $160 million a year. However, 
the agreement stipulates the province will make annual payments of $100 million to the 
federal government beginning in 2045. Crosbie—whose father was one of the signatories of 
the original deal—dismissed the accord as “pre-election razzle-dazzle” and suggested the 
money will do nothing to absolve the province of its financial woes (VOCM, 2019). Despite 
Liberal efforts, the deal soon vanished from public conversation.  
A weeklong flurry of spending announcements followed. There was money for fish plant 
workers, municipal infrastructure, immigration, agriculture, planning for a new prison in St. 
John’s, ocean technology, arts and culture, health care and more (Kinsella, 2019). On April 
15, Ball and Coady announced a long-anticipated rate mitigation plan to shelter citizens from 
the rising cost of electricity required to pay for Muskrat Falls. Economists warned that a plan 
was necessary because demand for electricity falls when prices go up (for more on price-
elasticity, see Feehan, 2018). Despite the fanfare, the rate mitigation plan was widely panned 
for merely shifting the financial burden from electricity consumers to the government.  
The next day, Finance Minister Osborne tabled an election year budget. His speech 
repeated the government’s preferred messaging: blame the Progressive Conservatives, extol 
that all Liberal MHAs were united behind the premier’s visionary leadership, mention The 
Way Forward, and promote economic optimism (Osborne, 2019). Election-style goodies 
were spread around, including a rebate on auto insurance taxes. The maligned deficit 
reduction levy would end as of December 31. An accounting slight of hand—specifically, 
integrating the Atlantic Accord money—allowed the government to say that it had returned 
to a budget surplus (CBC, 2019b). It was a sharp contrast with the fiscal rightsizing three 
years earlier that had sparked public unrest. 
Writ Drop  
On April 17, Premier Ball visited Lieutenant Governor Judy Foote to request that an election 
be held on May 16. For the second consecutive election, fixed-date election legislation was 
ignored to the governing party’s political advantage. The writ drop came just one day after 
tabling the budget. The early dissolution of the House of Assembly meant there would be no 
budget debate, no review of budget estimates and no vote on the budget. Ball said that this 
was a way of taking the budget to voters’ doorsteps and “engaging Newfoundlanders and 
Labradorians” on provincial fiscal matters (Maher and Whiffen, 2019). 
The opposition leaders criticized the government for forgoing the budget debate and 
rushing the campaign, leaving them scrambling to secure candidates in all 40 electoral 
districts. PC and NDP house leaders issued a joint statement saying that an early election 




would cut short important government work. Ball used the writ drop as an opportunity to 
paint the Liberals as a steady and responsible alternative to the opposition. The 29-day 
sprint to Election Day was on. 
Campaign Dynamics 
Candidate Recruitment 
The 2015 election had been the first involving 40 seats, a reduction from 48. Among the 
anticipated benefits of reducing the number of MHAs was that the parties would have less 
difficulty recruiting candidates. In 2019, only the Liberals fielded a full slate. Their star 
recruit was Hasan Hai, who achieved local notoriety for leading a charitable fundraising 
campaign featuring a popular calendar of men dressed as mermaids. Originally from 
Pakistan, Hai attracted media attention for injecting diversity into a political arena 
dominated by Caucasians, most of whom are born and raised in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. The PCs failed to assemble a full slate. They did not run a candidate in Waterford 
Valley against Osborne because their intended nominee backed out at the final hour. After 
voting in advance polls had taken place, the party dropped its candidate in Cartwright – 
L’Anse au Clair over controversy about his anti-abortion and anti-same sex marriage 
comments. However, it was too late to remove the candidate from the party’s official roster.  
Recruitment was a serious problem for the NDP. Neither of its incumbents stood for re-
election. Lorraine Michael stepped aside so that Coffin could run in the Signal Hill – Quidi 
Vidi riding, traditionally an NDP stronghold in St. John’s. The party fielded its fewest 
candidates since 1972, appearing on the ballot in just 14 of the 40 electoral districts, mostly 
in St. John’s and its surrounding areas. By comparison, the freshly created NL Alliance ran 
candidates in nine districts. Joyce and Lane sought re-election as Independents; Kirby did 
not.  
Electioneering and Advertising  
Campaigning in the 2019 election was unremarkable. It followed the traditional fare of 
the main party leaders touring the province while the leaders of poorly resourced parties 
stayed close to their home districts. Liberal advertising had a higher production value than 
that of the PCs and the cash-rich party was less reliant on digital distribution than its 
opponents were. Party campaign strategies followed a timeworn playbook: the Liberals 
sought re-election by projecting optimism and instilling fear about the PCs; the PCs critiqued 
the Liberal government’s fiscal record; the NDP projected a social conscience while 
concentrating limited resources in a handful of seats; and the upstart NL Alliance struggled 
to achieve credibility. 
Liberal advertising oscillated between emphasizing Dwight Ball’s positivity and profiling 
members of the Liberal team. The party’s Website focused on Ball (Appendix 1). Progressive 
Conservative advertising and its Website emphasized Crosbie’s leadership while critiquing 
the premier’s financial management (Appendix 2). As part of the framing contest, Ball 
accused the PCs of dirty politics. He called out Crosbie’s campaign for the anti-Liberal 
robocalls unleashed by the right-wing group NL Strong. Crosbie denied any association with 
the group that was run by his former communications director (CBC, 2019e). The 
controversy intensified Crosbie’s difficulties with putting the “progressive” in Progressive 
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Conservative, particularly when combined with his initial defence of the Labrador 
candidate’s right to express social views that are contrary to that of the party before 
dropping him from the PC slate. 
The limited NDP and NL Alliance publicity budgets meant that they relied on digital 
communications that had trouble capturing the public imagination (e.g., Appendix 3 and 4). 
A novelty was stories about the Independent MHAs each seeking re-election on a shoestring 
budget. Media reports indicated that Humber – Bay of Islands in western Newfoundland was 
painted bright purple with Eddie Joyce’s Independent signs. He was portrayed as a long-time 
constituency man who frequented constituents’ birthday and anniversary parties (Roberts, 
2019). A similar story occurred on the outskirts of St. John’s in Mount Pearl – Southlands. 
Lane predicated his campaign on the assumption that voters were disenchanted with party 
politics and were looking for a candidate who would not be forced to toe the line. He re-used 
his 2015 campaign signs by affixing a bright yellow “INDEPENDENT” sticker covering the 
word Liberal. The Independents’ campaigns relied on leveraging name recognition, personal 
outreach, and voter dissatisfaction with the party leaders. 
Party Platforms and Issues  
Party election platforms likewise followed a timeworn approach. In Newfoundland and 
Labrador, political parties often look to their federal counterparts for policy direction, and 
the governing party emphasizes its accomplishments while championing the good news of 
an election year budget. There tends to be a stark contrast between the bureaucratic detail 
of its platform compared with those of opposition parties. The pattern was evident in 2019 
with one noticeable difference: the governing party downplayed its leader. 
The Liberal platform was largely a continuity of government messaging. It tweaked The 
Way Forward by using the slogan “Onward.” The platform repeated the Liberals’ overall 
theme that the province had turned a corner after difficult times caused by the Progressive 
Conservatives. For example: 
In order to save the province from the brink of financial ruin due to mismanagement 
by the previous Progressive Conservative government, your Liberal government 
made tough choices, some of which were not popular. The sun is breaking through 
the clouds and the return to surplus is drawing near. This means we can honour our 
promise to reduce taxes in our province, even while we mitigate Muskrat Falls. 
(Liberal Party of NL, 2019: 50) 
Notably, the party opted for a photograph of a family on the cover. Dwight Ball barely 
appeared in the document. 
Many of the Liberal pledges strained credibility given the party’s record of abandoning 
2015 commitments, the lack of detail and obvious spin. The Liberals pledged to eliminate the 
budget deficit by 2023 through a combination of decreased spending and increased revenue 
derived from the renegotiated Atlantic Accord. A new mental health and addictions facility 
was promised for St. John’s as well as a mental health unit in Labrador. Somehow, the 
government would increase the number of immigrants to the province. Promises about 
democratic reform, including changing campaign finance laws, were typically vapid: “The all-
party committee [on democratic reform] will review democratic processes in Newfoundland 
and Labrador with the goal of improving democracy to better serve residents of the 




province” (Liberal Party of NL, 2019: 71). Arguably, the most comprehensive section of the 
platform appeared at the end. The party declared a dedication to fighting workplace 
harassment and requiring all MHAs participate in mandatory respectful workplace training.  
The platforms of the opposition parties were similarly unsurprising. There was standard 
criticism of the government’s record of broken promises and other faults, often couched in 
hyperbole. The PC platform, dubbed “Yes With Ches,” was noticeably Crosbie-centric. It 
promoted pillars of jobs, affordable living, and honest leadership. The NDP released a short 
list of promises, including raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, lowering the voting age 
to 16, and supporting newcomers. The NL Alliance did not release a platform. It advocated 
an anti-elitism strand of democratic reform. 
Controversy arose with a week left in the campaign when the Liberals drew policy 
inspiration from its competitors’ platforms. A former NDP MHA running as a Liberal in Signal 
Hill – Quidi Vidi against Coffin made an announcement: a Liberal government would commit 
$5 million over three years for the arts community (Kelland, 2019). That the funding was not 
outlined in the Liberal platform and yet would be factored into that year’s budget was 
suspect; that a candidate who was not part of the government was making a spending 
announcement, even more so. Pandering to NDP supporters was blatant and mirrored the 
federal Liberals’ leftist turn.  
Debates and Polls 
Leaders’ debates were held in St. John’s on April 30 and May 1. The Newfoundland and 
Labrador Federation of Labour organized the first one. All four leaders stood behind 
podiums facing a small audience and fielded questions on topics of concern to the labour 
movement, such as labour standards, gender equality, and health care. It was a warm-up to 
the main event the next day, which was televised and livestreamed. The televised debate 
followed a standard format of a panel of journalists asking questions to leaders at podiums 
who talked over each other. It was the first time that many citizens gained familiarity with 
the leaders of the PCs and New Democrats. In both debates, Ball was assertive with Crosbie, 
attempting to portray him as someone who would cut health care spending. Crosbie was 
reserved, often pausing to listen as his opponents launched barbs at him. Coffin advocated 
typical NDP policy objectives. Pelly was excluded from the televised debate. He planned to 
release social media videos instead (McKenzie-Sutter, 2019a).  
Five public opinion polls were published during the campaign. Most indicated the 
election was a close race between the Liberals and PCs. The first poll showed the Liberals 
ahead, but subsequent data suggested the PCs had leads varying from two to nine points. The 
latter hinted at a late surge in PC support that did not materialize (Grenier, 2019). 
Election Results  
On May 16, 2019 the Liberals won exactly half of the seats in the House of Assembly (20 
MHAs) on 44 percent of the vote (Table 2). Most of the seat losses involved Liberal 
backbenchers. The party’s lone gain was Fortune Bay – Cape La Hune. Dwight Ball would 
head the first minority government since the short-lived Liberal (1971-72) and Progressive 
Conservative (1972) minority governments nearly half a century ago. 
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The Tories finished with 15 seats and 42 percent of the provincial vote.2 They made 
substantial gains across the island, including Tony Wakeham winning in Stephenville – Port 
au Port in the West. The surprise was the NDP. With just 6.3 percent of the vote, it held its 
two St. John’s seats, and eked out a victory in Labrador West. It was the provincial party’s 
second-best seat performance ever despite running a paltry campaign with few candidates.3 
The NL Alliance managed to obtain two percent of the vote; none of its candidates were 
elected. 
A twist was the electoral success of the two former Liberal MHAs who sought re-election 
as Independents. Independents are rarely elected in Canada and no Independent candidates 
had succeeded in Newfoundland and Labrador since the mid-1990s – and yet two were 
elected in 2019. Joyce won Humber – Bay of Islands in a landslide. In 2015, he was elected as 
a Liberal with 85 percent of the vote; this time, he won as an Independent with 67 percent, 
fully 50 percentage points ahead of the Liberal runner-up. Lane was elected with 44 percent 
of the vote, a margin of 15 points above Hasan Hai, the runner-up. Combined, the two 
Independent MHAs tallied more votes than all NL Alliance candidates, and were not far 
behind the NDP. As a sign of the competitiveness of the election, voter turnout increased by 
5.4 percent to 60.7 percent. 
Table 22015 and 2019 Newfoundland and Labrador General Election Results 
Party 2015 2019 
 Contested Won Votes % vote Contested Won Votes1 % vote 
Liberal  40 31 114,271 57.2 40 20 93,746 44.0 
NDP 40 2 24,176 12.1 14 3 13,432 6.3 
PC 40 7 60,143 30.1   381 15 90,138 42.3 
NL Alliance Did not exist 9 -- 5,086 2.4 
Other 4 -- 1,344 0.7 10 2 10,648 5.0 
1 The candidate on the ballot in Cartwright-L’Anse au Clair who was dropped by the PCs is treated as “other.” 
Officially, the PCs received 42.6 percent of the vote and non-affiliated received 4.7 percent. 
Source: Calculated from Elections Newfoundland and Labrador official results (www.elections.gov.nl.ca) 
Two Liberal cabinet ministers were ousted from the House. Minister of Education and 
Early Childhood Development Allan Hawkins (Grand Falls Windsor – Buchans) and Minister 
of Municipal Affairs and the Environment Graham Letto (Labrador West) both lost. Letto’s 
defeat by just five votes to NDP candidate Jordan Brown meant that whether the Liberals 
would be able to form a majority or minority government hung in the balance. A judicial 
recount would favour the NDP by a mere two votes. 
The electoral math—and the more efficient Liberal vote—would have shifted had the 
NDP fielded more candidates (which would have disproportionately bled support from 
Liberal candidates) or if the NL Alliance had not existed (whose supporters would have 
disproportionately voted for PC candidates). Under these assumptions, the presence of an 
NDP candidate might have flipped approximately three Liberal seats to the PCs (Burin – 
 
2 Excludes votes received by the former PC candidate in Cartwright-L’Anse au Clair. The party’s 
official vote total was 42.6 percent. 
3 The NDP averaged 18.7 percent of the vote in the 14 ridings where it fielded candidates. 
 
 




Grand Bank; Fortune Bay – Cape La Hune; Harbour Grace – Port de Grave), while the absence 
of an Alliance candidate might have resulted in the PCs defeating Liberals in two seats (Baie 
Verte – Green Bay; Mount Scio). The Liberal victory would undoubtedly have been narrower 
and possibly Ches Crosbie would have attempted to form a government. 
Crosbie certainly did not behave in a statesmanlike manner on election night. At first, he 
refused to concede. Then, he made the gruesome prediction that Premier Ball’s “head is going 
to be on a platter” within a year’s time (Mackey, 2019). Crosbie stayed out of the public eye 
as anger grew in the days that followed. Nearly a week later he emerged to apologize and 
vowed to make the legislature work. 
Post-Election: Dwight Ball’s Second Term, 2019-2020  
Premier Ball and his cabinet appeared confident as they were sworn in at Government House 
on May 30. Familiar faces in familiar roles were present. There was only one new minister, 
Brian Warr (Baie Verte – Green Bay), who took over the education and early childhood 
development portfolio vacated by Hawkins. Minister of Children, Seniors, and Social 
Development Lisa Dempster (Cartwright – L’Anse au Clair) absorbed the municipal and 
environment portfolios vacated by Letto, dangling the possibility that he might return in the 
event that the judicial recount declared him elected.   
The first test of confidence arose in June. The Liberals passed the budget with the help of 
the three NDP MPs and Lane. A cabinet shuffle would happen months later, bringing the 
number of ministers back to 14 when Perry Trimper (Lake Mellville) moved out of the 
Speaker’s chair and back into cabinet. The appointment was short-lived. Within a week, 
Trimper resigned after the Innu Nation circulated an accidental voicemail recording wherein 
the minister made comments the organization deemed racist (CBC, 2019g). 
An adage in politics is to under-promise and over-deliver. In the 2019 provincial election, 
the only leader who exceeded expectations was Allison Coffin. In the electoral aftermath, the 
media speculated that Liberals would mobilize to oust Ball, while Crosbie agreed to be 
subjected to a leadership review (Cowan, 2019; Gushue, 2019). Dysfunction resumed when 
the legislature reconvened. Suddenly, on February 17, 2020 local suppertime news 
broadcasts ran a submitted video of the premier announcing plans to resign upon the 
selection of a new Liberal leader. Once again, Newfoundland and Labrador was thrust into 
political turmoil precisely when it required a steady hand. 
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